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Cooperation in conflict
Investigating the patterns and outcomes 
of coalitions in the field of organized violence
ABSTRACT
Social embeddedness may ensure a facilitating context for cooperation and the opportunity 
of individual actors to harmonize their interests. In a corresponding social setting coalitions can
be formed that have the potential to support goal-attainment. By outlining a brief theoretical
frame we intend to apply the concept of social embeddedness and cooperation in the rather specific
field of international conflicts. We introduce two case studies investigating the structure of the global
coalition of the war on terrorism, and the long-term trends of terrorist attacks and the international
cooperation network of terrorist organizations. Based on the results of the case studies we seek
to shed some light empirically on the patterns and outcomes of cooperation and coalition building.
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1. RESEARCH TOPIC AND CONCEPTUAL REMARKS
In his economic sociological program Mark GRANOVETTER (2006) introduced a concept to efficiently
understand economic action, outcomes and institutions. The approach of embeddedness investigates
economic issues from a network perspective: individual actions tend to be integrated into wider
social relations. The outcomes and success of economic action depend not only on the characteristics
of the actual relationship between the actors (relational aspect of embeddedness), but the overall
patterns of the participants’ network play an important role. This latter; structural aspect 
of embeddedness highlights the diverse social composition of individual goal attainment (GRANOVETTER
2006. 34–36.). The issue of the structural dimension of embeddeness had been widely raised
in the frame of structural balance theory, and from an analytical perspective it has been explicated
by SZÁNTÓ (2008) as a specific instance of a three-agent configuration of the prisoner’s dilemma.
In this argument there can be distinguished four stable and four imbalanced socio-matrices (SZÁNTÓ
2008. 326–328.) which reflect the problem of cooperation in a social context when there can
be one actor who – by the decision to join one of the others – might disrupt balance between
the two others and this cooperative act might lead to the emergence of a coalition. After two
agents linked together and formed a coalition, they have a majority in the triad against the third
actor and an asymmetric relationship emerges in which the two joining ones might have better
perspectives in the process of goal-attainment.
This particular cooperation form and the problem of coalition is the central topic of this paper
which attempts to empirically investigate the pattern and outcomes of cooperation and coalition
building with case studies in the specific field of international conflicts.
The nature of violent conflicts and the features of warfare seem to be remarkably changed
in the beginning of the new millennium. Various disciplines of the social sciences interpret these
changes under the paradigm of new wars (KESTNBAUM 2009. 240–241., MALEŠEVIÆ 2008. 98–100.).
In accordance with the cross-border tendencies of the new millennium – integrating the world
into an inter-connected system (ROSTOVÁNYI 2002. 72.) in a major extent due to the information
logistics and replacement system covering more than one continent (JÓZSA 2002. 100.) – conflicts;
security and terrorism also took a new form (HASKÓ 2002: 14–15.). A global space (KISS 2002. 39.)
and global threats (ROSTOVÁNYI 2002. 77.) emerged, in which the challenge caused by the cross-
border terrorist networks became more remarkable (KISS 2002. 40–42.). That is, in accordance
with the global changes, wars after the end of the 20th century differ from the earlier ones in several
dimensions. A wider social scientific approach argues that the new warfare can be represented
by two different – but fundamentally related – types of wars. The form of (1) parasitic/predatory war
is based on the ruins of states that have been fallen behind in the fierce process of global
economic liberalization due to their lack of abilities to keep up with their competitors. In these
failed states then privatization of violence – among others – appears. In the process of global economic
liberalization (2) technologically advanced western form of warfare is employed to facilitate 
to gain new markets worldwide and sanction or force potential adversaries of the global course.
This latter form of war is linked generally to the developments of the military system and 
the technology applied: the dominance of air power, increase of precision, the possibility to carry
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out operations from a distance and so lessening the risk of experiencing remarkable casualties
(MALEŠEVIÆ 2008. 100.).1
The concepts of asymmetric warfare, fourth generation war, gray zone conflicts and new terrorism
can be regarded – at least partially – as responses to these processes in the discipline of military science.
Asymmetric warfare refers to the changes and innovation in war by distinguishing particular
dimensions of asymmetry in the field of the power and the cost of the threats and the time factor,
but most of all asymmetry in the methods and objectives (RESPERGER 2015. 14–15.) is particularly
important from the perspective of this paper. The adversary in an asymmetric conflict seeks to apply
new methods to attack and/or resist. It is also noteworthy that the participants in this new form
of war are primarily not states (SOMKUTI 2015. 50.) as the nation-state has lost its monopoly 
of violence (KISS 2015. 71.).
In the concept of fourth generation war decentralisation as one of the distinctive features 
is emphasized, and the role of initiative – inherited from third generation war – becomes even
more significant. The emergence of non-state opponents and the lost monopoly on war are key
points in this case as well. Furthermore, a return of the role of culture in the sphere of conflicts
must also be mentioned (LIND 2004). Aremarkable ‘innovation’(SCHUMPETER 1980.) can be observed
in the organisational dimension of confrontation: beside decentralisation, a self-organizing network
structure appears and the processes indicate that networks tend to be less and less concentrated and dense
(KISS 2015. 71.). It proves to be a commonly accepted assumption that international terrorism
is one of the most visible forms of fourth generation war (SOMKUTI 2015. 60.) and the connectedness
of asymmetric warfare and terrorism is also acknowledged (RESPERGER 2015: 14.).
The issue that the state has lost its monopoly of violence broadens the spectrum of international
encounters. The concepts of gray zone or hybrid conflicts (OSKARSSON 2017; BRANDS 2016)
refer to the cases when a rather complex compilation of methods, tactics and strategic thinking
is present in an actual situation. This unique way of war proves to be an essential part of the approach
followed by the USA – represented by the unconventional warfare methods applied by special
operations forces (VOTEL et. al. 2016; BRANDS 2016. 3.; FREIER et. al. 2016; OSKARSSON 2017. 16.) –,
although the most active state and non-state gray zone actors are considered to be Russia, China,
Iran, North Korea; the Islamic State and Boko Haram (BRANDS 2016. 2., OSKARSSON 2017. 5–6.,
VOTEL et. al. 2016. 102., FREIER et. al. 2016. 33–40., 41–55.). Since the international order as it exists
today is advantageous for the United States and the Western world, contemporary gray zone
activities fundamentally aim to modify or rather to oppose this status quo (BRANDS 2016. 2., 6.,
OSKARSSON 2017. 6.). Besides the traditional hard power (HLATKY 2016), further unconventional
tactics and methods play a significant role – e.g. cyberattacks, information warfare, propaganda,
political warfare, economic coercion, the use of proxy fighters, misinformation, deception –
forming a challenge that is political and military at the same time and relies heavily on the social effects
(BRANDS 2016. 2., 6., OSKARSSON 2017. 6–7., VOTEL et. al. 2016. 102., HLATKY 2016. 1.).
1 In the sense of technological supremacy of the methods applied the global war on terrorism could be seen as a proper
example of a globalizing or technologically advanced western form of war. Considering, however, the thorough
critical review of the new wars paradigm it might be more appropriate to say that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
– included in the global war on terrorism – were much less globalizing ones; ideology and geopolitics could have
played an essential role (MALEŠEVIÆ 2008. 103–110.).
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Scholars of terrorism also argue that certain noteworthy changes could be observed in the market
of terrorism (TÁLAS 2006. 8.). One of the concepts interpreting these developments introduces
the notion of new terrorism, distinguishing it from the former (old) type (NEUMANN 2009). This new
pattern of terrorism is regarded as a more diffuse, de-territorialized one, and involves transnational
networks. Its further characteristics are that the motivation is based on religion, attacks tend 
to be more violent, and mass-casualty aggression becomes more frequent. Although some also argue
that it might be more proper to distinguish between the network approach and the organizational
aspect while studying the further progressions in the field of terrorism (TUCKER 2008).
2. CASE STUDIES
2.1 The global coalition of the war on terrorism
The international coalition against terrorism – initiated at the end of 2001 – can be considered
a rather multifaceted one – at least if we examine the participants involved: the overall number
of belligerents is 181.132 countries from all regions of the world fought or fight against 
49 terrorist organizations, insurgent groups and even pirates in several international missions.
Eleven international missions and operations are2 analysed, from 2001. 10. 07. (the starting date
of the Afghanistan operations) to the Operation Inherent Resolve. 
We investigate the cooperation network of the states based on their participation in the missions
and operations. It needs to be stated that the network we could draw from this research does
not necessarily reflects the actual importance of the states in direct combat activities.3 It could
rather be interpreted as a nominal or symbolic partnership among nation states to overcome 
the global threat of terrorism. The structure of the cooperation network proves to be rather complex,
and notable differences can be observed among the participants (Graph 1). According to some
quantitative indicators the United States of America plays the most important and central role
in the cooperation, that is, the highest level of involvement can be measured in the case of the initiator.
The mean value of degree centrality – the number of ties or links towards other countries 
in the cooperation network – is 96,4 coupled with a standard deviation of 54,8. Considering 
the distribution – in the light of the value range defined by the mean and the twofold ± standard
deviation statistics – further countries can be identified as ones highly embedded in the network
structure (e.g. Australia, United Kingdom, Spain).4
As for the characteristics of the top members of both the collaborating countries and the enemies
it can be assumed that the first ten percent – the first 13 of 132 countries and the first five 
of the 49 enemies (Graph 2) – of the participants cover approximately one-fifth of the overall links.
2 NATO-ISAF, Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A), Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P),
Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), Operation Enduring Freedom – Pankisi Gorge, Operation
Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), Operation Enduring Freedom – Kyrgyzstan, support for the Northern
Alliance, Multi-National Force – Iraq, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, Combined Joint Task Force –
Operation Inherent Resolve.
3 It is particularly true if we consider that the objectives of some of the missions and operations included in the analysis
were solely training (e.g. Operation Enduring Freedom – Pankisi Gorge), capacity building (e.g. Combined Joint Task
Force – Horn of Africa) or access to physical infrastructure (e.g. airbase; Operation Enduring Freedom – Kyrgyzstan).
4 These measures are calculated for the sub-graph of the participating countries, the data of the enemies’ is not taken
into account.
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GRAPH 1 Cooperation network of 132 countries against 49 enemies in the global war on terrorism.
Legend: white circle = countries; grey square = enemies (Source: own calculation and edition
based on complex dataset)
GRAPH 2 The sub-graph of the top countries and top enemies. Legend: white circle = countries;
grey square = enemies (Source: Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)
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The top countries participating in the global coalition – besides the USA including ones
from Western Europe, Africa and even Eastern Europe – possess 17,2 percent of the relations,
while the most remarkable enemies – dominated by the two greatest ones; Al-Qaeda and the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) – acquire exactly 20 percent of the ties (Table 1).
TABLE 1 Share of the top countries and top enemies from the links (Source: own calculation
and edition based on complex dataset)
Considering the structure of the differences among the participating countries in the global war
on terrorism, macro-level organizational integration seems to be a clear factor as both in the case
of European Union member states and the NATO member countries significantly higher level
of involvement can be measured: compared to the mean value (96,4) the average degree centrality
indicator of the EU member states is remarkably higher (147,1), and the NATO countries show
an even greater level of participation with an average value of 162,3 relations (Table 2).
It is also a clear empirical pattern that the status of the participating country in the globalized
world order is roughly proportional to its position in the coalition against global terrorism. Investigating
the Global Connectedness Index5 a moderate positive correlation (R = 0,53) can be observed indicating
the tendency that the higher the rate of globalization, the higher the involvement in the global
cooperation against terrorism is of the countries participating (Figure 1).
5 Mean values for the time period between 2005–2015 for that data is available. Source: own calculation based on the data
of Ghemawat. P – Altman, S.A. “DHL Global Connectedness Index 2016” Deutsche Post DHL, November 2016.,
http://www.dhl.com/en/about_us/logistics_insights/studies_research/global_connectedness_index/global_connectedness_
index.html#.VFff5MkpXuM
# Top countries % of ties Top enemies % of ties
1 United States of America 1,8 Al-Qaeda 5,1
2 Mali 1,5 ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) 5,0
3 Somalia 1,4 Boko Haram 3,7
4 Spain 1,4 Abu Sayyaf 3,2
5 United Kingdom 1,4 Aal-Nusra Front 3,0
6 Morocco 1,3
7 Tunisia 1,3
8 France 1,2
9 Germany 1,2
10 Australia 1,2
11 Georgia 1,2
12 New Zealand 1,2
13 Ukraine 1,2
Sum 17,2 Sum 20,0
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A similar positive relationship – although a much lower correlation coefficient (R = 0,22) –
can be measured in the case of the global firepower of the countries (Figure 2). The general pattern
shows that the higher the level of military potential6 of the country, the higher its degree centrality
in the network proves to be. However the rather low correlation value expresses that there 
FIGURE 1 Involvement in coalition of the war on terror and global connectedness (Source:
own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)
Degree centrality
(number of relations)
Not EU member states 83,4
EU member states 147,1
Not NATO member states 78,7
NATO member states 162,3
Mean 96,4
TABLE 2 Higher involvement of EU and NATO states in the global war on terrorism (Source:
own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)
6 In order to make the general positive correlation recognizable between global fire power and the involvement level
in the cooperation network against global terrorism I transformed the initial fire power index values which originally
indicate higher military potential with lower – closer to zero – fire power index. I calculated the inverse values of global
fire power (GFP) according to this function: GFPinverse = (GFP)
–1.
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is a remarkably less intense connection which might be – at least partially – explained by the apparent
outliers at the lower value range of the horizontal axis. That is, these countries are characterized
by approximately the highest level of global fire power coupled with degree centrality values
belonging to the lowest value range.7
We might conclude from this brief empirical overview of the global war on terrorism that
a great number of countries from all over the globe allied in a complex coalition against a smaller
group of various enemies. Both the leading participating countries and the top enemies could
be identified, and further interesting tendencies could be explored: a higher level of involvement
in the international cooperation network can be observed in the case of EU and NATO member states,
the more globalized countries, furthermore the states possessing armies with more significant fire power.
However, the more important question from the perspective of this paper is the outcome 
or success of the cooperation. That is, whether this rather monumental global coalition managed
to overcome – or even eliminate – the threat of international terrorism. In our second case study
we wish to empirically shed some light on this latter problem.
7 Russia and China can be identified as the two outliers which implies that two of the main gray zone actors of the world
(see BRANDS 2016: 2., OSKARSSON 2017: 5–6., VOTEL et. al. 2016: 102., FREIER et. al. 2016: 33–40., 41–55.) are integrated
– at least in a certain level and with a specific kind of ‘friend and foe’ pattern – into the USA-led coalition against
global terrorism.
8 In order to make the different trends more apparent we calculated the three-year moving average values from the raw
frequency data and visualized it on the time-series figure.
FIGURE 2 Involvement in the coalition of the war on terror and global firepower (Source:
own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)
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2.2 Global network of international terrorism
Based on the long-term time-series of the terrorist attacks there could be revealed three
different trends (Figure 3):8 the period ranging from the beginning date of the database (1970)
until 1989 can be characterized by relatively small but increasing number of terrorist actions.
After the fall of the bipolar world structure and before the announcement of the global war 
on terrorism – that is, in the period between 1990 and 2001 – the number of terrorist attacks seem
to be decreasing. Whilst in the present phase a remarkable growth of the terrorist attacks can
be observed, specifically after the first decade of the new millennia.
It is also indicative for the disproportional distribution of the terrorist attacks that in the first
period almost one-third (28,9 percent) of the total number of actions can be found, in the second
period less than one-fourth (22,9 percent), while in the third period starting after the emergence
of the global war on terrorism, nearly half of all the terrorist attacks (48,3 percent) is contained.
That is, according to this simple temporal distribution of the number of terrorist incidents
it could not be stated that after the international coalition to fight global terrorism was formed,
the presence of the threat had been mitigated. Actually, the opposite can be observed: since 
the announcement of the global war on terrorism, the number of terrorist attacks seems to continue
to increase. 
Nevertheless the period of the war on terror proves to bring further developments in the field
of international terrorism – the one we intend to highlight in the second part of this case study
is the emergence and diffusion of cooperative terrorist attacks. 
In the light of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) the share of the attacks carried out
collaboratively by at least two terrorist groups is 0,7 percent of the total in the period investigated:
FIGURE 3 Number terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2014 (Source: own calculation and edition
based on GTD data)
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930 cases can be identified as cooperative attacks. The temporal dynamics and regional differences
of the diffusion process is worth to be given a brief description. As for the dynamics of the evolution
process, only approximately one-tenth (11,1 percent) of the 930 cooperative terrorist actions occurred
before 1990. Furthermore, by the end of the century they still comprise only less than one-fourth
(23,4 percent) of the total. So it seems that – considering the temporal process – cooperation
as the part of the tactics of the terrorist organizations becomes truly notable in the new millennium.
Cooperative terrorist attack proves to be an innovation from the North American region as the first
terrorist case of this kind in the database for the period can be found in this area (Figure 4).
However the regional distribution of these cooperative actions shows that it is not the North
American region where this particular kind of terrorism proves to be dominant. It might be rather
stated that the rate of the cooperative terrorist attacks prove to be the highest in the South Asia
and Middle East-North Africa regions. The two regions – with nearly equal numbers of cooperative
terrorist attacks – account for nearly three-fifths (58,6 percent) of all such attacks. In the regions
of South America and the Sub-Saharan Africa the proportion of the cooperative form of terrorism
is also relatively higher (13,8 percent and 10,0 percent, respectively) compared to the areas 
of Southeast Asia, North America and Western Europe, where the share of cooperative threats
is at around 5 percent, while in the rest of the world the presence of the collaborative manner
among the terrorist groups seem to be insignificant.
FIGURE 4 Regional diffusion of cooperative terrorist attacks (Source: own calculation and edition
based on GTD data)
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Considering the separate diffusion processes in the various areas, there seems to be an approximately
steady growth in the South America region where the number of cooperative attacks exceeds
120 by the end of the period, although it might be more remarkable that the most rapid pace 
of growth can be observed in the South Asia, Middle East and North Africa regions.9 That is,
the cooperative form of terrorist attacks seems to flourish mostly in the areas where the operations
of the war on terrorism were executed.10
The significance of the terrorist actors from the South Asia and Middle East and North Africa
regions also appears in the global terrorist network as both in number (Table 3) and in relative
importance (several of) the terrorist groups of the area seem to have an outstanding role (Graph 3).
TABLE 3 Regional distribution of cooperative terrorist organisations (Source: own calculation
and edition based on GTD data)
9 It is also notable that these extremely intense growth processes in these regions seem to emerge in a specific accordance
with the diffusion process in the North America region. Namely, since the late 1990s or the early years of 21st century
there has been no further increase in the number of cooperative terrorist attacks in North America, and approximately
the same time – the cooperative form of terrorism has emerged and begun to quickly spread in the South Asia and
the Middle East-North Africa regions. So, the latter regions seem to show a delayed, but intensively growing adaptation,
resulting in a terrorist practice characterised by a remarkable portion of this organizational innovation of violence
originated in the North American area.
10 Furthermore considering the diffusion processes in the South Asia and Middle East-North Africa regions it is also important
that by the end of the period investigated in this analysis the curves representing the cumulative number of terrorist
attacks carried out in a collaborative manner do not seem to lose their steepness; the diffusion processes do not prove
to reach a saturation level. That is, it cannot be expected – considering the processes explored from the time series data –
that this intensive progress would slow down, i.e. a further increase and importance of cooperative terrorist attacks
might follow in the South Asia and Middle East and North Africa regions.
11 The network includes a total number of 435 terrorist groups and organizations that could be clearly identified and recognized
as relevant. That is, the name of the organization is known, recognizable and relevant (the cases in the database nominated
as ‘other’or ‘individual’were excluded from the analysis) furthermore the regional affiliation of the group can also be ascertained
(both the lack of information and the indefinite affiliation information in the database was treated as missing case).
Region Frequency (%)
North America 18 4,1
Central America and Caribbean 14 3,2
South America 29 6,7
Southeast Asia 17 3,9
South Asia 126 29,0
Central Asia 4 0,9
Western Europe 48 11,0
Eastern Europe 10 2,3
Middle East and North Africa 112 25,7
Sub-Saharan Africa 55 12,6
Australasia and Oceania 2 0,5
Total 435 100,0
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Terrorist organizations from the regions of Australasia–Oceania and Central Asia prove 
to be the least involved in cooperative terrorist actions as only a tiny number and very low rate
can be measured in these areas.11 In the case of Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia and the regions
of the American continent (Central America and the Caribbean, North America, South America)
the share of the terrorist groups involved in actions carried out in a collaborative manner is also low,
not reaching ten percent. The terrorist organisations in Western Europe and the Sub-Saharan Africa
areas incorporate above ten percent (11,0 percent and 12,6 percent, respectively) of the cooperative
terrorist groups, and more than the half of the organizations (54,7 percent) carrying out terrorist
attacks in cooperation belong to either the Middle East and North Africa region (25,7 percent)
or the South Asia area (29,0 percent).
GRAPH 3 Network of cooperative terrorist organisations (Source: own calculation and edition
based on GTD network data)
One of the structural characteristics – beside the composition regarding regional affiliation
of the groups – of the network built among certain terrorist organisations through cooperative
attacks is a kind of fragmentation: the interacting groups of Australasia and Oceania are completely
isolated from the other actors of the network, and an analogous situation can be observed in the case
of the groups and relations of the Eastern Europe region (Graph 4). The central area of the American
continent (Central America and Caribbean region) and the North America region prove to be similar
to the former Eastern Europe area in the sense that these consist of also basically few and less significant
organisations, however it should be noted that in these regions bridging ties (GRANOVETTER 1991)
connecting organisations from other regions can already be observed.
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GRAPH 4 Network of cooperative terrorist organisations (regional clusters) (Source: own calculation
and edition based on GTD network data)
The most remarkable regions in the global network of cooperative terrorist actors are inevitably
those of the South Asia and the Middle East-North Africa as these two areas supplemented 
– as densely linked – with the groups of the Sub-Saharan Africa and Central- and Southeast
Asia regions. Aside from the regional differences of the composition, frequency and relative
importance of the particular elements of the terrorist network arisen from the cooperative actions,
another structural characteristic is a global integration. As there can be observed, several ties
which connect organisations from different areas of the world resulting one single interregional,
globally embedded terrorist network. 
It has been shown, that – essentially after the beginning of the war on terrorism – by the middle
of the 2010’s through the diffusion of cooperation among terrorist groups a globally linked and
integrated network of terrorist groups has evolved. This consequence can be regarded as a brand
new threat, particularly if we investigate the benefits of cooperative terrorist attacks.
As the results of data analysis suggest, cooperation provides a noticeable advantage for 
the organisations involved. The success rate of the terrorist attacks is higher in the case of the actions
carried out with a partner (multiple, cooperative attack) compared to those implemented by a single
organisation alone (single attack). Considering the latter type of attacks, 90,9 percent of the terrorist
actions appear to be successful (Table 4), while in the case of the multiple (cooperative) ones the share
of success is 93,9 percent – a relatively small but statistically significant difference.
TABLE 4 Benefits of cooperative terrorist actions (Source: calculations by the author, based on GTD)
However cooperation not only raises the success rate itself, but also proves to increase both
the physical/infrastructural and the social/human destructive potential of the successful attacks.
In the case of the multiple (cooperative) terrorist events a higher rate of remarkable material
damage can be measured in contrast to the single attacks (8,2 percent vs. 2,6 percent respectively).
Considering the human dimension, cooperative terrorist actions are characterised by more casualties.
In the attacks carried out by a single organisation on average 2,29 persons get killed,12 while in the case
of the cooperative terrorist actions the average number of persons killed is 6,39; significantly higher.
The same pattern, but an even greater difference can be measured in the number of wounded persons:
in a single terrorist attack approximately 3 persons become wounded on average, and cooperation
increases the number of wounded innocent victims to 10,25 persons on average. That is, as a general
tendency it can be said that cooperation – to mention only the most important outcomes – nearly
triple the average number of persons killed in the terrorist actions and increases more than three
times the average number of wounded persons and the share of significant infrastructural damage.
Considering the main outcomes of the case study it can be argued that after the launch 
of the global war on terrorism the number of terrorist attacks have not decreased – actually 
it has risen, furthermore by the middle of the first decade of the new millennia the overall network
of the cooperative terrorist attacks encompasses the whole globe linking the different regions
and this embeddedness proves to be beneficial also on micro-level for the violent organisations
as the collaborative forms of terrorist threats are characterised by higher success rate and superior
destructive capacity.
3. CLOSING REMARKS
In this paper we introduced the results of two case studies investigating the patterns and outcomes
of cooperation and coalition building in the rather specific field of organized conflicts. The outcomes
of the research imply that a reasonably complex structure has evolved through the participation
of several countries in the global coalition of the war on terror to fight some of the most violent
terrorist organizations and other types of adversaries. We described the composition and the differences
of both the cooperating countries and the pursued violent organizations, furthermore outlined some
connections between the integration level of the countries in the coalition and their position 
in the global sphere. However, studying the long-term time-series of terrorist actions there could
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12 The number of terrorist killed in the attack – if relevant – is excluded from the analysis.
Share of remarkable
material damage (%)
Success rate
(%)
N. of killed
(average p.)
N. of wounded
(average p.)
Single attack 2,6 90,9 2,29 3,02
Multiple (cooperative)
attack
8,2 93,9 6,39 10,25
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be explored different tendencies of this specific form of international violence and in the recent
period a noteworthy growth could be measured. Furthermore it could also be confirmed in the second
case study that in the field of terrorist cooperation a global network has also emerged, characterized
by participants and attacks with more remarkable destructive potential. So considering the impact
of the global coalition, it could be stated that the war on terrorism could not succeed to abolish,
not even to mitigate or reduce the global threat of terrorism. That is, it might be argued that the coalition
of the war on terrorism had been counterproductive, resulted in counter-final consequence.
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